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Abstract
We study the paradigmatic fair division problem of allocating a divisible good among agents with
heterogeneous preferences, commonly known as cake cutting. Classical cake cutting protocols are sus-
ceptible to manipulation. Do their strategic outcomes still guarantee fairness?
To address this question we adopt a novel algorithmic approach, by designing a concrete computa-
tional framework for fair division — the class of generalized cut and choose (GCC) protocols — and
reasoning about the game-theoretic properties of algorithms that operate in this model. The class of GCC
protocols includes the most important discrete cake cutting protocols, and turns out to be compatible with
the study of fair division among strategic agents. In particular, GCC protocols are guaranteed to have ap-
proximate subgame perfect Nash equilibria, or even exact equilibria if the protocol’s tie-breaking rule is
flexible. We further observe that the (approximate) equilibria of proportional GCC protocols — which
guarantee each of the n agents a 1/n-fraction of the cake — must be (approximately) proportional. Fi-
nally, we design a protocol in this framework with the property that its Nash equilibrium allocations
coincide with the set of (contiguous) envy-free allocations.
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1 Introduction
How should one allocate resources among economic agents with heterogeneous preferences, in a way that
is fair to everyone involved? The rigorous study of this question dates back to the 1940’s; it has led to an
extensive body of literature in economics, mathematics, and political science, with several books written
on the topic [43, 50, 10, 57]. More recently, fair division has become an important problem in computer
science [47, 16, 20, 24, 8, 7, 17, 3, 37, 14, 18, 48, 49, 6, 51, 52, 5, 2, 21, 4]; specific focus areas include
the allocation of computational resources [31, 33, 36, 22, 46], and the implementation and deployment of
practical, provably fair solutions for real-world problems [45, 1, 32, 38, 30, 15].
Among problems in fair division, the so-called cake cutting problem is perhaps the most paradigmatic.
It was formalized by Steinhaus [54] during World War II and studied in a rich body of literature over the
years. The cake is a metaphor for a heterogeneous divisible resource, such as land, time, memory in shared
computing systems, clean water, greenhouse gass emissions, or fossil fuels.
Going back to the word “fair”, two formal notions of fairness have emerged as the most appealing and
well-studied in the context of cake cutting: proportionality, in which each of the n agents receives at least a
1/n-fraction of the entire cake according to its valuation; and envy-freeness, which stipulates that no agent
would wish to swap its own piece with that of another agent. At the heart of the cake cutting endeavor is the
design of cake cutting protocols, which specify an interaction between agents — typically via iterative steps
of manipulating the cake — such that the final allocation is guaranteed to be proportional or envy-free.
The simplest cake cutting protocol is known as cut and choose, and is designed for two agents. The first
agent cuts the cake in two pieces that it values equally; the second agent then chooses the piece that it prefers,
leaving the first agent with the remaining piece. It is easy to see that this protocol yields a proportional and
envy-free allocation (in fact these two notions coincide when there are only two agents and the entire cake
is allocated). However, taking a game-theoretic point of view, it is immediately apparent that the agents can
often do better by disobeying the protocol when they know each other’s valuations. For example, in the cut
and choose protocol, assume the first agent only desires a specific small piece of cake, whereas the second
agent uniformly values the cake. The first agent can obtain its entire desired piece, instead of just half of it,
by carving that piece out.
So how would strategic agents behave when faced with the cut and choose protocol? A standard way
of answering this question employs the notion of Nash equilibrium: each agent would use a strategy that is
a best response to the other agent’s strategy. To set up a Nash equilibrium, suppose that the first agent cuts
two pieces that the second agent values equally; the second agent selects its more preferred piece, and the
one less preferred by the first agent in case of a tie. Clearly, the second agent cannot gain from deviating, as
it is selecting a piece that is at least as preferred as the other. As for the first agent, if it makes its preferred
piece even bigger, the second agent would choose that piece, making the first agent worse off. Interestingly
enough, in this equilibrium the tables are turned; now it is the second agent who is getting exactly half of its
value for the whole cake, while the first agent generally gets more. Crucially, the equilibrium outcome is also
proportional and envy-free. In other words, even though the agents are strategizing rather than following the
protocol, the outcome in equilibrium has the same fairness properties as the “honest” outcome!
With this motivating example in mind, we would like to make general statements regarding the equilibria
of cake cutting protocols. We wish to identify a general family of cake cutting protocols — which captures
the classic cake cutting protocols — so that each protocol in the family is guaranteed to possess (approxi-
mate) equilibria. Moreover, we wish to argue that these equilibrium outcomes are fair. Ultimately, our goal
is to be able to reason about the fairness of cake divisions that are obtained as outcomes when agents are
presented with a standard cake cutting protocol and behave strategically.
2
1.1 Model and Results
To set the stage for a result that encompasses classic cake cutting protocols, we introduce (in Section 2) the
class of generalized cut and choose (GCC) protocols. A GCC protocol is represented by a tree, where each
node is associated with the action of an agent. The tree has two types of nodes: a cut node, which instructs the
agent to make a cut between two existing cuts; and a choose node, which offers the agent a choice between
a collection of pieces that are induced by existing cuts. Moreover, we assume that the progression from a
node to one of its children depends only on the relative positions of the cuts (in a sense to be explained
formally below). We argue that classic protocols — such as Dubins-Spanier [25], Selfridge-Conway (see
[50]), Even-Paz [29], as well as the original cut and choose protocol — are all GCC protocols.
We view the definition of the class of GCC protocols as one of our main conceptual contributions, since
cake cutting protocols have not enjoyed a computational model until this work.
In Section 3, we observe that GCC protocols may not have exact Nash equilibria (NE), then explore
ways of circumventing this issue, which give rise to our first two main results.
• We prove that every GCC protocol has at least one ǫ-NE for every ǫ > 0, in which agents cannot gain
more than ǫ by deviating, and ǫ can be chosen to be arbitrarily small. In fact, we establish this result
for a stronger equilibrium notion, (approximate) subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE), which is,
intuitively, a strategy profile where the strategies are in NE even if the game starts from an arbitrary
point.
• We slightly augment the class of GCC protocols by giving them the ability to make informed tie-
breaking decisions that depend on the entire history of play, in cases where multiple cuts are made
at the exact same point. While, for some valuation functions of the agents, a GCC protocol may not
possess any exact SPNE, we prove that it is always possible to modify the protocol’s tie-breaking
scheme to obtain SPNE.
In Section 4, we observe that for any proportional protocol, the outcome in any ǫ-equilibrium must be
an ǫ-proportional division. We conclude that under the classic cake cutting protocols listed above — which
are all proportional — strategic behavior preserves the proportionality of the outcome, either approximately,
or exactly under informed tie-breaking.
One may wonder, though, whether an analogous result is true with respect to envy-freeness. We give
a negative answer, by constructing an envy-inducing SPNE under the Selfridge-Conway protocol, a well-
known envy-free protocol for three agents.
However, our third main result is the construction of a GCC protocol in which every NE outcome is
a contiguous envy-free allocation and vice versa, that is, the set of NE outcomes coincides with the set of
contiguous envy-free allocations. This shows that the GCC framework is compatible with arguably the most
important notion of fairness, namely envy-freeness. It remains open whether a similar result can be obtained
for SPNE instead of NE.
1.2 Related Work
The notion of GCC protocols is inspired by the Robertson-Webb [50] model of cake cutting — a concrete
query model that specifies how a cake cutting protocol may interact with the agents. This model underpins
a significant body of work in theoretical computer science and artificial intelligence, which focuses on the
complexity of achieving different fairness or efficiency notions in cake cutting [27, 28, 56, 23, 3, 47, 37]. In
Section 2, we describe the Roberston-Webb model in detail, and explain why it is inappropriate for reasoning
about equilibria.
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In the context of the strategic aspects of cake cutting, Nicolo` and Yu [44] were the first to suggest
equilibrium analysis for cake cutting protocols. Focusing exclusively on the case of two agents, they design
a specific cake cutting protocol whose unique SPNE outcome is envy-free. And while the original cut and
choose protocol also provides this guarantee, it is not “procedural envy free” because the cutter would like
to exchange roles with the chooser; the two-agent protocol of Nicolo´ and Yu aims to solve this difficulty.
Braˆnzei and Miltersen [12] also investigate equilibria in cake cutting, but in contrast to our work they focus
on one cake cutting protocol — the Dubins-Spanier protocol — and restrict the space of possible strategies
to threshold strategies. Under this assumption, they characterize NE outcomes, and in particular they show
that in NE the allocation is envy-free. Braˆnzei and Miltersen also prove the existence of ǫ-equilibria that
are ǫ-envy-free; again, this result relies on their strong restriction of the strategy space, and applies to one
specific protocol.
Several papers by computer scientists [19, 42, 40] take a mechanism design approach to cake cutting;
their goal is to design cake cutting protocols that are strategyproof, in the sense that agents can never benefit
from manipulating the protocol. This turns out to be an almost impossible task [58, 13]; positive results are
obtained by either making extremely strong assumptions (agents’ valuations are highly structured), or by
employing randomization and significantly weakening the desired properties. In contrast, our main results,
given in Section 3, deal with strategic outcomes under a large class of cake cutting protocols, and aim to
capture well-known protocols; our result of Section 4 is a positive result that achieves fairness “only” in
equilibrium, but without imposing any restrictions on the agents’ valuations.
2 The Model
The cake cutting literature typically represents the cake as the interval [0, 1]. There is a set of agents N =
{1, . . . , n}, and each agent i ∈ N is endowed with a valuation function Vi that assigns a value to every
subinterval of [0, 1]. These values are induced by a non-negative continuous value density function vi, so
that for an interval I , Vi(I) =
∫
x∈I vi(x) dx. By definition, Vi satisfies the first two properties below; the
third is an assumption that is made w.l.o.g.
1. Additivity: For every two disjoint intervals I1 and I2, Vi(I1 ∪ I2) = Vi(I1) + Vi(I2).
2. Divisibility: For every interval I ⊆ [0, 1] and 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1 there is a subinterval I ′ ⊆ I such that
Vi(I
′) = λVi(I).
3. Normalization: Vi([0, 1]) = 1.
Note that valuation functions are non-atomic, i.e., they assign zero value to points. This allows us to
disregard the boundaries of intervals, and in particular we treat intervals that overlap at their boundary as
disjoint. We sometimes explicitly assume that the value density functions are strictly positive, i.e., vi(x) > 0
for all x ∈ [0, 1] and for all i ∈ N ; this implies that Vi([x, y]) > 0 for all x < y, x, y ∈ [0, 1].
A piece of cake is a finite union of disjoint intervals. We are interested in allocations of disjoint pieces
of cake X1, . . . ,Xn, where Xi is the piece allocated to agent i ∈ N . A piece is contiguous if it consists of a
single interval.
We study two fairness notions. An allocation X is proportional if for all i ∈ N , Vi(Xi) ≥ 1/n; and
envy-free if for all i, j ∈ N , Vi(Xi) ≥ Vi(Xj). Note that envy-freeness implies proportionality when the
entire cake is allocated.
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2.1 Generalized Cut and Choose Protocols
The standard communication model in cake cutting was proposed by Robertson and Webb [50]; it restricts
the interaction between the protocol and agents to two types of queries:
• Cut query: Cuti(x, α) asks agent i to return a point y such that Vi([x, y]) = α.
• Evaluate query: Evaluatei(x, y) asks agent i to return a value α such that Vi([x, y]) = α, where the
points x, y are either 0, 1, or have been generated as answers to previous Cut queries.
Note that in the RW model, a protocol could allocate pieces depending on whether a particular cut was made
at a specific point (see Algorithm 2). More generally, a protocol in the RW model has a property such as
envy-freeness if, roughly speaking, it gathers enough information so that there exists an allocation such that
for any valuation function consistent with the answers to the queries, the allocation is envy-free. Since the
RW model does not specify how the allocation is computed, there need not exist a succinct representation
of the allocation that arises as the outcome of a protocol, which makes it difficult to analyze the strategic
properties of protocols in the RW model.
For this reason, we define a generic class of protocols that are implementable with natural operations,
which capture all bounded1 and discrete cake cutting algorithms, such as cut and choose, Dubins-Spanier,
Even-Paz, Successive-Pairs, and Selfridge-Conway (see, e.g., [48]). At a high level, the standard protocols
are implemented using a sequence of natural instructions, each of which is either a Cut operation, in which
some agent is asked to make a cut in a specified region of the cake; or a Choose operation, in which some
agent is asked to take a piece from a set of already demarcated pieces indicated by the protocol. In addition,
every node in the decision tree of the protocol is based exclusively on the execution history and absolute
ordering of the cut points, which can be verified with any of the following operators: <,≤,=,≥, >.
Formally, a generalized cut and choose (GCC) protocol is implemented exclusively with the following
instructions:
• Cut: The syntax is “i Cuts in S”, where S = {[x1, y1], . . . , [xm, ym]} is a set of contiguous pieces
(intervals), such that the endpoints of every piece [xj , yj] are 0, 1, or cuts made in previous steps of
the protocol. Agent i can make a cut at any point z ∈ [xj , yj], for some j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}.
• Choose: The syntax is “i Chooses from S”, where S = {[x1, y1], . . . , [xm, ym]} is a set of contiguous
pieces, such that the endpoints of every piece [xj , yj] ∈ S are 0, 1, or cuts made in the previous steps
of the protocol. Agent i can choose any single piece [xj , yj] from S to keep from that point on.
• If-Else Statements: The conditions depend on the result of choose queries and the absolute order of all
the cut points made in the previous steps.
A GCC protocol uniquely identifies every contiguous piece by the symbolic names of all the cut points
contained in it. For example, Algorithm 1 is a GCC protocol. Algorithm 2 is not a GCC protocol, because
it verifies that the point where agent 1 made a cut is exactly 1/3, whereas a GCC protocol can only verify
the ordering of the cut points relative to each other and the endpoints of the cake. Note that, unlike in the
communication model of Robertson and Web [50], GCC protocols cannot obtain and use information about
the valuations of the agents — the allocation is only decided by the agents’ Choose operations.
As an illustrative example, we now discuss why the discrete variant of the Dubins-Spanier protocol2
belongs to the class of GCC protocols — but first we must describe the original Dubins-Spanier protocol.
1In the sense that the number of operations is upper-bounded by a function that takes the number of agents n as input.
2In fact, the discrete variant of Dubins-Spanier was invented much earlier by Banach and Knaster and is better known as the
“last diminisher” procedure (see Steinhaus [54]).
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agent 1 Cuts in {[0, 1]} // @x
agent 1 Cuts in {[0, 1]} // @y
agent 1 Cuts in {[0, 1]} // @z
if (x < y < z) then
agent 1 Chooses from {[x, y], [y, z]}
end if
Algorithm 1: A GCC protocol. The notation “// @x” assigns the symbolic name x to the cut point made by
agent 1.
agent 1 Cuts in {[0, 1]} // @x
if
(
x = 13
)
then
agent 1 Chooses from {[0, x], [x, 1]}
end if
Algorithm 2: A non-GCC protocol.
Dubins-Spanier is a proportional (but not envy-free) protocol for n agents, which operates in n rounds. In
round 0, each agent makes a mark x1i such that the piece of cake to the left of the mark is worth 1/n, i.e.,
Vi([0, x
1
i ]) = 1/n. Let i∗ be the agent that made the leftmost mark; the protocol allocates the interval [0, x1i∗ ]
to agent i∗; the allocated interval and satisfied agent are removed. In round t, the same procedure is repeated
with the remaining n − t agents and the remaining cake. When there is only one agent left, it receives the
remaining cake. To see why the protocol is proportional, first note that in round t the remaining cake is worth
at least 1− t/n to each remaining agent, due to the additivity of the valuation functions and the fact that the
pieces allocated in previous rounds are worth at most 1/n to these agents. The agent that made the leftmost
mark receives a piece that it values at 1/n. In round n − 1, the last agent is left with a piece of cake worth
at least 1− (n− 1)/n = 1/n.
The protocol admits a GCC implementation as follows. For the first round, each agent i is required to
make a cut in {[0, 1]}, at some point denoted by x1i . The agent i∗ with the leftmost cut x1i∗ can be determined
using If-Else statements whose conditions only depend on the ordering of the cut points x11, . . . , x1n. Then,
agent i∗ is asked to choose “any” piece in the singleton set {[0, x1i∗ ]}. The subsequent rounds are similar:
at the end of every round the agent that was allocated a piece is removed, and the protocol iterates on
the remaining agents and remaining cake. Note that agents are not constrained to follow the protocol, i.e.,
they can make their marks (in response to cut instructions) wherever they want; nevertheless, an agent can
guarantee a piece of value at least 1/n by following the Dubins-Spanier protocol, regardless of what other
agents do.
While GCC protocols are quite general, a few well-known cake cutting protocols are beyond their reach.
For example, the Brams-Taylor [9] protocol is an envy-free protocol for n agents, and although its individual
operations are captured by the GCC formalism, the number of operations is not bounded as a function of
n (i.e., it may depend on the valuation functions themselves). Its representation as a GCC protocol would
therefore be infinitely long. In addition, some cake cutting protocols use moving knives (see, e.g., [11]); for
example, they can keep track of how an agent’s value for a piece changes as the piece smoothly grows larger.
These protocols are not discrete, and, in fact, cannot be implemented even in the Robertson-Webb model.
We also note that the GCC model is incomparable to the RW model. Indeed, given a protocol in the RW
model, it may not be possible to implement it as a GCC protocol because the RW model does not indicate
a specific allocation, as discussed above. Conversely, cut queries in the GCC model cannot in general be
translated into cut queries in the RW model, as in the latter model cuts are associated with a specific value.
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2.2 The Game
We study GCC protocols when the agents behave strategically. Specifically, we consider a GCC protocol,
coupled with the valuation functions of the agents, as an extensive-form game of perfect information (see,
e.g., [53]). In such a game, agents execute the Cut and Choose instructions strategically. Each agent is fully
aware of the valuation functions of the other agents and aims to optimize its overall utility for the chosen
pieces, given the strategies of other agents.
While the perfect information model may seem restrictive, the same assumption is also made in previous
work on equilibria in cake cutting [44, 12]. More importantly, it underpins foundational papers in a variety of
areas of microeconomic theory, such as the seminal analysis of the Generalized Second Price (GSP) auction
by Edelman et al. [26]. A common justification for the complete information setting, which is becoming
increasingly compelling as access to big data gets pervasive, is that agents can obtain significant amounts of
information about each other from historical data.
In more detail, the game can be represented by a tree (called a game tree) with Cut and Choose nodes:
• In a Cut node defined by “i cuts in S”, where S = {[x1, y1], . . . , [xm, ym]}, the strategy space of
agent i is the set S of points where i can make a cut at this step.
• In a Choose node defined by “i chooses from S”, where S = {[x1, y1], . . . , [xm, ym]}, the strategy
space is the set {1, . . . ,m}, i.e., the indices of the pieces that can be chosen by the agent from the set
S.
The strategy of an agent defines an action for each node of the game tree where it executes a Cut or a
Choose operation. If an agent deviates, the game can follow a completely different branch of the tree, but
the outcome will still be well-defined.
The strategies of the agents are in Nash equilibrium (NE) if no agent can improve its utility by uni-
laterally deviating from its current strategy, i.e., by cutting at a different set of points and/or by choosing
different pieces. A subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) is a stronger equilibrium notion, which means
that the strategies are in NE in every subtree of the game tree. In other words, even if the game started from
an arbitrary node of the game tree, the strategies would still be in NE. An ǫ-NE (resp., ǫ-SPNE) is a relaxed
solution concept where an agent cannot gain more than ǫ by deviating (resp., by deviating in any subtree).
3 Existence of Equilibria
It is well-known that finite extensive-form games of perfect information can be solved using backward
induction: starting from the leaves and progressing towards the root, at each node the relevant agent chooses
an action that maximizes its utility, given the actions that were computed for the node’s children. The induced
strategies form an SPNE. Unfortunately, although we consider finite GCC protocols, we also need to deal
with Cut nodes where the action space is infinite, hence naı¨ve backward induction does not apply.
In fact, it turns out that not every GCC protocol admits an exact NE — not to mention SPNE. For
example, consider Algorithm 1, and assume that the value density function of agent 1 is strictly positive.
Assume there exists a NE where agent 1 cuts at x∗, y∗, z∗, respectively, and chooses the piece [x∗, y∗]. If
x∗ > 0, then the agent can improve its utility by making the first cut at x′ = 0 and choosing the piece
[x′, y∗], since V1([x′, y∗]) > V1([x∗, y∗]). Thus, x∗ = 0. Moreover, it cannot be the case that y∗ = 1, since
the agent only receives an allocation if y∗ < z∗ ≤ 1. Thus, y∗ < 1. Then, by making the second cut at
any y′ ∈ (y∗, z∗), agent 1 can obtain the value V1([0, y′]) > V1([0, y∗]). It follows that there is no exact NE
where the agent chooses the first piece. Similarly, it can be shown that there is no exact NE where the agent
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chooses the second piece, [y∗, z∗]. This illustrates why backward induction does not apply: the maximum
value at some Cut nodes may not be well defined.
3.1 Approximate SPNE
One possible way to circumvent the foregoing example is by saying that agent 1 should be happy to make
the cut y very close to z. For instance, if the agent’s value is uniformly distributed over the case, cutting at
x = 0, y = 1 − ǫ, z = 1 would allow the agent to choose the piece [x, y] with value 1 − ǫ; and this is true
for any ǫ.
More generally, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 1. For any n-agent GCC protocol P with a bounded number of steps, any n valuation functions
V1, . . . , Vn, and any ǫ > 0, the game induced by P and V1, . . . , Vn has an ǫ-SPNE.
The proof of Theorem 1 is relegated to A. In a nutshell, the high-level idea of our proof relies on
discretizing the cake — such that every cell in the resulting grid has a very small value for each agent —
and computing the optimal outcome on the discretized cake using backward induction. At every cut step of
the protocol, the grid is refined by adding a point between every two consecutive points of the grid from the
previous cut step. This ensures that any ordering of the cut points that can be enforced by playing on the
continuous cake can also be enforced on the discretized instance. Therefore, for the purpose of computing an
approximate SPNE, it is sufficient to work with the discretization. We then show that the backward induction
outcome from the discrete game gives an ǫ-SPNE on the continuous cake.
3.2 Informed Tie-Breaking
Another approach for circumventing the example given at the beginning of the section is to change the tie-
breaking rule of Algorithm 1, by letting agent 1 choose even if y = z (in which case agent 1 would cut in
x = 0, y = 1, z = 1, and get the entire cake). Tie-breaking matters: even the Dubins-Spanier protocol fails
to guarantee SPNE existence due to a curious tie-breaking issue [12].
To accommodate more powerful tie-breaking rules, we slightly augment GCC protocols, by extending
their ability to compare cuts in case of a tie. Specifically, we can assume without loss of generality that
the If-Else statements of a GCC protocol are specified only with weak inequalities (as an equality can be
specified with two inequalities and a strong inequality via an equality and weak inequality), which involve
only pairs of cuts. We consider informed GCC protocols, which are capable of using If-Else statements of
the form “if [x < y or (x = y and history of events ∈ H)] then”. That is, when cuts are made in the same
location and cause a tie in an If-Else, the protocol can invoke the power to check the entire history of events
that have occurred so far. We can recover the x < y and x ≤ y comparisons of “uninformed” GCC protocols
by setting H to be empty or all possible histories, respectively. Importantly, the history can include where
cuts were made exactly, and not simply where in relation to each other.
We say that an informed GCC protocol P ′ is equivalent up to tie-breaking to a GCC protocol P if
they are identical, except that some inequalities in the If-Else statements of P are replaced with informed
inequalities in the corresponding If-Else statements of P ′. That is, the two protocols are possibly different
only in cases where two cuts are made at the exact same point.
For example, in Algorithm 1, the statement “if x < y < z then” can be specified as “if x < y then if
y < z then”. We can obtain an informed GCC protocol that is equivalent up to tie-breaking by replacing
this statement with “if x < y then if y ≤ z then” (here we are not actually using augmented tie-breaking).
In this case, the modified protocol may feel significantly different from the original — but this is an artifact
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of the extreme simplicity of Algorithm 1. Common cake cutting protocols are more complex, and changing
the tie-breaking rule preserves the essence of the protocol.
We are now ready to present our second main result.
Theorem 2. For any n-agent GCC protocol P with a bounded number of steps and any n valuation functions
V1, . . . , Vn, there exists an informed GCC protocol P ′ that is equivalent to P up to tie-breaking, such that
the game induced by P ′ and V1, . . . , Vn has an SPNE.
Intuitively, we can view P ′ as being “undecided” whenever two cuts are made at the same point, that is,
x = y: it can adopt either the x < y branch or the x > y branch — there exists an appropriate decision.
The theorem tells us that for any given valuation functions, we can set these tie-breaking points in a way
that guarantees the existence of an SPNE. In this sense, the tie-breaking of the protocol is informed by the
given valuation functions. Indeed, this interpretation is plausible as we are dealing with a game of perfect
information.
The proof of Theorem 2 is somewhat long, and has been relegated to B. This proof is completely different
from the proof of Theorem 1; in particular, it relies on real analysis instead of backward induction on a
discretized space. The crux of the proof is the development of an auxiliary notion of mediated games (not
to be confused with Monderer and Tennenholtz’s mediated equilibrium [41]) that may be of independent
interest. We show that mediated games always have an SPNE. The actions of the mediator in this SPNE are
then reinterpreted as a tie-breaking rule under an informed GCC protocol. In the context of the proof it is
worth noting that some papers prove the existence of SPNE in games with infinite action spaces (see, e.g.,
[34, 35]), but our game does not satisfy the assumptions required therein.
4 Fair Equilibria
The existence of equilibria (Theorems 1 and 2) gives us a tool for predicting the strategic outcomes of cake
cutting protocols. In particular, classic protocols provide fairness guarantees when agents act honestly; but
do they provide any fairness guarantees in equilibrium?
We first make a simple yet crucial observation. In a proportional protocol, every agent is guaranteed a
value of at least 1/n regardless of what the others are doing. Therefore, in every NE (if any) of the protocol,
the agent still receives a piece worth at least 1/n; otherwise it can deviate to the strategy that guarantees it a
utility of 1/n and do better. Similarly, an ǫ-NE must be ǫ-proportional, i.e., each agent must receive a piece
worth at least 1/n − ǫ. Hence, classic protocols such as Dubins-Spanier, Even-Paz, and Selfridge-Conway
guarantee (approximately) proportional outcomes in any (approximate) NE (and of course this observation
carries over to the stronger notion of SPNE).
One may wonder, though, whether the analogous statement for envy-freeness holds; the answer is nega-
tive. We demonstrate this via the Selfridge-Conway protocol — a 3-agent envy-free protocol, which is given
in its truthful, non-GCC form as Algorithm 3. To see why the protocol is envy free, note that the division
of three pieces in steps 4, 5, and 6 is trivially envy free. For the division of the trimmings in step 9, agent i
is not envious because it chooses first, and agent j is not envious because it was the one that cut the pieces
(presumably, equally according to its value). In contrast, agent 1 may prefer the piece of trimmings that
agent i received in step 9, but overall agent 1 cannot envy i, because at best i was able to “reconstruct” one
of the three original pieces that was trimmed at step 2, which agent 1 values as much as the untrimmed piece
it received in step 6.
We construct an example by specifying the valuation functions of the agents and their strategies, and
arguing that the strategies are in SPNE. The example will have the property that the first two agents receive
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1: Agent 1 cuts the cake into three equal parts in the agent’s value.
2: Agent 2 trims the most valuable of the three pieces such that there is a tie with the two most valuable
pieces.
3: Set aside the trimmings.
4: Agent 3 chooses one of the three pieces to keep.
5: Agent 2 chooses one of the remaining two pieces to keep — with the stipulation that if the trimmed
piece is not taken by agent 3, agent 2 must take it.
6: Agent 1 takes the remaining piece.
7: Denote by i ∈ {2, 3} the agent which received the trimmed piece, and j = {2, 3} \ {i}.
8: Agent j now cuts the trimmings into three equal parts in the agent’s value.
9: Agents i, 1, and j choose one of the three pieces to keep in that order.
Algorithm 3: Selfridge-Conway: an envy-free protocol for three agents.
utilities of 1 (i.e. the maximum value). Therefore, we can safely assume their play is in equilibrium; this will
allow us to define the strategies only on a small part of the game tree. In contrast, agent 3 will deviate from
its truthful strategy to gain utility, but in doing so will become envious of agent 1.
In more detail, suppose after agent 2 trims the three pieces we have the following.
• Agent 1 values the first untrimmed piece at 1, and all other pieces and the trimmings at 0.
• Agent 2 values the second untrimmed piece at 1, and all other pieces and the trimmings at 0.
• Agent 3 values the untrimmed pieces at 1/7 and 0, the trimmed piece at 1/14, and the trimmings at
11/14.
Now further suppose that if agent 3 is to cut the trimmings (i.e. take on the role of j in the protocol), then the
first two agents always take the pieces most valuable to agent 3. Thus, if agent 3 does not take the trimmed
piece it will achieve a utility of at most 1/7+(11/14)(1/3) = 119/294 by taking the first untrimmed piece,
and then cutting the trimmings into three equal parts. On the other hand, if agent 3 takes the trimmed piece
of worth 1/14, agent 2 cuts the trimmings into three parts such that one of the pieces is worth 0 to agent 3,
and the other two are equivalent in value (i.e. they have values (11/14)(1/2) = 11/28). Agents 1 and 3 take
these two pieces. Thus, in this scenario, agent 3 receives a utility of 1/14+11/28 = 13/28 which is strictly
better than the utility of 119/294. Agent 3 will therefore choose to take the trimmed piece. However, in this
outcome agent 1, from the point of view of agent 3, receives a piece worth 1/7 + 11/28 = 15/28 and so
agent 3 will indeed be envious.
The foregoing example shows that envy-freeness is not guaranteed when agents strategize, and so it is
difficult to produce envy-free allocations when agents play to maximize their utility. A natural question to
ask, therefore, is whether there are any GCC protocols such that all SPNE are envy-free, and existence of
SPNE is guaranteed. This remains an open question, but we do give an affirmative answer for the weaker
solution concept of NE in the following theorem, whose proof appears in C.
Theorem 3. There exists a GCC protocol P such that on every cake cutting instance with strictly positive
valuation functions V1, . . . , Vn, an allocation X is the outcome of a NE of the game induced by P and
V1, . . . , Vn if and only if X is an envy-free contiguous allocation that contains the entire cake.
Crucially, an envy-free contiguous allocation is guaranteed to exist [55], hence the set of NE of protocol
P is nonempty.
10
Theorem 3 is a positive result a` la implementation theory (see, e.g., [39]), which aims to construct games
where the NE outcomes coincide with a given specification of acceptable outcomes for each constellation
of agents’ preferences (known as a social choice correspondence). Our construction guarantees that the
NE outcomes coincide with (contiguous) envy-free allocations, i.e. in this case the envy-freeness criterion
specifies which outcomes are acceptable.
That said, the protocol P constructed in the proof of Theorem 3 is interesting theoretically, but it re-
mains to be determined when its Nash equilibria arise in practice. This further motivates efforts to find an
analogous result for SPNE. If such a result is indeed feasible, a broader, challenging open question would
be to characterize GCC protocols that give rise to envy-free SPNE, or at least provide a sufficient condition
(on the protocol) for the existence of such equilibria.
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A Proof of Theorem 1
Let ǫ > 0, and let f(n) be an upper bound on the number of operations (i.e., on the height of the game
tree) of the protocol. Define a grid, G1, such that every cell on the grid is worth at most ǫ2f(n)2 to each
agent. For every n, let K denote the maximum number of cut operations, where 0 ≤ K ≤ f(n). For each
i ∈ {1, . . . ,K}, we define the grid Gi so that the following properties are satisfied:
• The grids are nested, i.e., {0, 1} ⊂ G1 ⊂ G2 ⊂ . . . ⊂ GK .
• There exists a unique point z ∈ Gi+1 between any two consecutive points x, y ∈ Gi, such that x <
z < y and z 6∈ Gi, for every i ∈ {1, . . . ,K − 1}.
• Each cell on Gi is worth at most ǫ2f(n)2 to any agent, for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,K}.
Having defined the grids, we compute the backward induction outcome on the discretized cake, where
the i-th Cut operation can only be made on the grid Gi. We will show that this outcome is an ǫ-SPNE, even
though agents could deviate by cutting anywhere on the cake. On the continuous cake, the agents play a
perturbed version of the idealized game from the grid G, but maintain a mapping between the perturbed
game and the idealized version throughout the execution of the protocol, such that each cut point from the
continuous cake is mapped to a grid point that approximates it within a very small (additive) error. Thus
when determining the next action, the agents use the idealized grid as a reference. The order of the cuts is
the same in the ideal and perturbed game, however the values of the pieces may differ by at most ǫ/f(n).
We start with the following useful lemma. (For ease of exposition, in the following we refer to [x, y] as
the segment between points x and y, regardless of whether x < y or y ≤ x.)
Lemma 1. Given a sequence of cut points x1, . . . , xk and nested grids G1 ⊂ . . . ⊂ Gk with cells worth at
most ǫ
4f(n)2
to each agent, there exists a map M : {x1, . . . , xk} → Gk such that:
(1) For each i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, M(xi) ∈ Gi.
(2) The map M is order-preserving. Formally, for all i, j ∈ {1, . . . , k}, xi < xj ⇐⇒ M(xi) < M(xj)
and xi = xj ⇐⇒ M(xi) =M(xj).
(3) The piece [xi,M(xi)] is “small”, that is: Vl([xi,M(xi)]) ≤ kǫ2f(n)2 , for each agent l ∈ N .
Proof. We prove the statement by induction on the number of cut points k.
Base case: We consider a few cases. If x1 ∈ G1, then define M(x1) := x1. Otherwise, let R(x1) ∈ G1
be the leftmost point on the grid G1 to the right of x1. If R(x1) 6= 1, define M(x1) := R(x1); else, let
L(x1) denote the rightmost point on G1 strictly to the left of 1 and define M(x1) := L(x1). To verify the
properties of the lemma, note that:
(1) M(x1) ∈ G1.
(2) The map M is order-preserving since there is only one point.
(3) Vl([x1,M(x1)]) ≤ ǫ2f(n)2 for each agent l ∈ N since the grid G1 has (by construction) the property that
each cell is worth at most ǫ2f(n)2 to each agent, and the interval [x1,M(x1)] is contained in a cell.
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Induction hypothesis: Assume that a map M with the required properties exists for any sequence of
k − 1 cut points.
Induction step: Consider any sequence of k cut points x1, . . . , xk. By the induction hypothesis, we can
map each cut point xi to a grid representative M(xi) ∈ Gi, for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k−1}, in a way that preserves
properties 1–3. We claim that the map M on the points x1, . . . , xk−1 can be extended to the k-th point, xk,
such that the entire sequence M(x1), . . . ,M(xk) satisfies the requirements of the lemma. We consider four
exhaustive cases.
(a) There exists i ∈ {1, . . . , k − 1} such that xk = xi. Then define M(xk) :=M(xi).
(b) There exists i ∈ {1, . . . , k − 1} such that xi < xk, but M(xi) ≥ xk. Let xj be the rightmost cut such
that xj < xk; because M is order-preserving, it holds thatM(xj) ≥ xk. Let R(M(xj)) be the leftmost
point on Gk strictly to the right of M(xj), and set M(xk) := R(M(xj)).
Now let us check the conditions. Condition (1) holds by definition. Condition (2) holds becauseM(xk) >
M(xj), and for every t such that xt > xk,M(xt) >M(xj) and M(xt) ∈ Gk−1, whereas M(xk) uses
a “new” point of Gk \Gk−1 that is closer to M(xj). For condition (3), we have that for every l ∈ N ,
Vl([xk,M(xk)])
≤ Vl([xj ,M(xk)])
= Vl([xj ,M(xj)]) + Vl([M(xj),M(xk)])
≤
(k − 1)ǫ
2f(n)2
+
ǫ
2f(n)2
≤
kǫ
2f(n)2
,
where the third transition follows from the induction assumption.
(c) There exists i ∈ {1, . . . , k− 1} such that xi > xk, but M(xi) ≤ xk. This case is symmetric to case (b).
(d) For every xi such that xi < xk, M(xi) ≤ xk, and for every xj such that xj > xk, M(xj) ≥ xk. Let
xi and xj be the rightmost and leftmost such cuts, respectively; without loss of generality they exist,
otherwise our task is even easier.
Let R(xk) be the leftmost point in Gk such that R(xk) ≥ xk, and let L(xk) be the rightmost point in
Gk such that L(xk) ≤ xk. Assume first that M(xj) > R(xk); then set M(xk) := R(xk). This choice
obviously satisfies the three conditions, similarly to the base of the induction.
Otherwise, R(xk) =M(xj) (notice that it cannot be the case that R(xk) >M(xk)); then setM(xk) :=
L(xk). Let us check that this choice is order-preserving (as the other two conditions are trivially satis-
fied). Note that M(xj) ∈ Gk−1, so R(xk) ∈ Gk−1. Therefore, it must hold that L(xk) ∈ Gk \ Gk−1
— it is the new point that we have added between R(xk), and the rightmost point the left of it on Gk−1.
Since it is also the case that M(xi) ∈ Gk−1, we have that M(xi) <M(xk) <M(xj).
By induction, we can compute a mapping with the required properties for k points. This completes the
proof of the lemma.
Now we can define the equilibrium strategies. Let x1, . . . , xk be the history of cuts made at some point
during the execution of the protocol. By Lemma 1, there exists an order-preserving map M such that each
point xi has a representative point M(xi) ∈ Gi and the piece [xi,M(xi)] is “small”, i.e.
Vl([xi,M(xi)]) ≤
kǫ
2f(n)2
≤
ǫ
2f(n)
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for each agent l ∈ N — using k ≤ f(n).
Consider any history of cuts (x1, . . . , xk). Let i be the agent that moves next. Agent i computes the
mapping (M(x1), . . . ,M(xk)). If the next operation is:
• Choose: agent i chooses the available piece (identified by the symbolic names of the cut points it
contains and their order) which is optimal in the idealized game, given the current state and the existing
set of ordered ideal cuts, M(x1), . . . ,M(xk). Ties are broken according to a fixed deterministic
scheme which is known to all the agents.
• Cut: agent i computes the optimal cut on Gk+1, say at x∗k+1. Then i maps x∗k+1 back to a point xk+1
on the continuous game, such that M(xk+1) = x∗k+1. That is, the cut xk+1 (made in step k + 1) is
always mapped by the other agents to x∗k+1 ∈ Gk+1. Agent i cuts at xk+1.
We claim that these strategies give an ǫ-SPNE. The proof follows from the following lemma, which we
show by induction on t (the maximum number of remaining steps of the protocol):
Lemma 2. Given a point in the execution of the protocol from which there are at most t operations left until
termination, it is tǫ
f(n) -optimal to play on the grid.
Proof. Consider any history of play, where the cuts were made at x1, . . . , xk. Without loss of generality,
assume it is agent i’s turn to move.
Base case: t = 1. The protocol has at most one remaining step. If it is a cut operation, then no agent
receives any utility in the remainder of the game regardless of where the cut is made. Thus cutting on the
grid (Gk) is optimal. If it is a choose operation, then let Z = {Z1, . . . , Zs} be the set of pieces that i can
choose from. Agent i’s strategy is to map each piece Zj to its equivalent M(Zj) on the grid Gk, and choose
the piece that is optimal on Gk. Recall that Vq([xj ,M(xj)]) ≤ ǫ2f(n) for each agent q ∈ N . Thus if a piece
is optimal on the grid, it is ǫ
f(n) -optimal in the continuous game (adding up the difference on both sides). It
follows that i cannot gain more than ǫ
f(n) in the last step by deviating from the optimal piece on Gk.
Induction hypothesis: Assume that playing on the grid is (t−1)ǫ
f(n) -optimal whenever there are at most t−1
operations left on every possible execution path of the protocol, and there exists one path that has exactly
t− 1 steps.
Induction step: If the current operation is Choose, then by the induction hypothesis, playing on the grid
in the remainder of the protocol is (t−1)ǫ
f(n) -optimal for all the agents, regardless of i’s move in the current step.
Moreover, agent i cannot gain by more than ǫ
f(n) by choosing a different piece in the current step, compared
to piece which is optimal on Gk, since Vi([xl,M(xl)]) ≤ ǫ2f(n) for all l ∈ {1, . . . , k}.
If the current operation is Cut, then the following hold:
1. By construction of the grid Gk+1, agent i can induce any given branch of the protocol using a cut in
the continuous game if and only if the same branch can be induced using a cut on the grid Gk+1.
2. Given that the other agents will play on the grid for the remainder of the protocol, agent i can change
the size of at most one piece that it receives down the road by at most ǫ
f(n) by deviating (compared to
the grid outcome), since Vj([xl,M(xl)]) ≤ ǫ2f(n) for all l ∈ {1, . . . , k + 1} and for all j ∈ N .
Thus by deviating in the current step, agent i cannot gain more than tǫ
f(n) .
Since t ≤ f(n), the overall loss of any agent is bounded by ǫ by Lemma 2. We conclude that playing on
the grid is ǫ-optimal for all the agents, which completes the proof of the theorem.
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B Proof of Theorem 2
Before we begin, we take this moment to formally introduce the auxiliary concept of a mediated game in
an abstract sense. We will largely distance ourselves from the specificity of GCC games here and work in a
more general model. We do this for two purposes. First, it allows for a cleaner view of the techniques; and
second, we believe such general games may be of independent interest. We begin with a few definitions.
Definition 1. In an extensive-form game, an action tuple is a tuple of actions that describe an outcome of
the game. For example, the action tuple (a1, ..., ar) states that a1 was the first action to be played, a2 the
second, and ar the last.
Definition 2. Given an action tuple, the kth action is said to be SPNE if the subtree of the game tree rooted
where the first k− 1 actions are played in accordance to the action tuple is induced by some SPNE strategy
profile. Furthermore, call such an action tuple k-SPNE.
Note that if the kth action is SPNE, so too are all actions succeeding it in the action tuple. To clarify
Definition 2, note that strategies of an extensive-form game are defined on every possible node of the game
tree, so a k-SPNE action tuple can be equivalently defined as being an SPNE of the subgame rooted at the
kth action.
With these definitions in hand, we can now describe the games of interest.
Definition 3. We call an extensive-form game a mediated game if the following conditions hold:
1. The set of agents consists of a single special agent, referred to as the mediator, and some finite number
n of other regular agents. Intuitively, the mediator is an agent who is overseeing the proper execution
of a protocol.
2. The height h of the game tree is bounded.
3. Every agent’s utility is bounded.
4. Starting from the first or second action, the mediator plays every second action (and only these ac-
tions).
5. Every action played by the mediator shares the same action space:
{0, ..., n} ×
(
[0, 1]2 ∪ 2{1,...,h}
)
.
This represents the agent who plays next (0 represents ending the game), and the interval which
represents their action space or the allowed pieces they may choose from.
6. The mediator’s utility is binary (i.e. it is in {0, 1}) and is described entirely by the notion of allowed
edges. This is a set of edges in the game tree such that the mediator’s utility is 1 iff it plays edges only
in this set. Importantly, this set has the property that for every allowed edge, each grandchild subtree
(i.e. subtree that represents the next mediator’s action) must have at least one allowed edge from its
root. Intuitively, these edges are the ones that follow the protocol the mediator is implementing.
7. A regular agent’s utility is continuous3 in the action tuple.
3The notions of convergence, compactness and continuity, which we will utilize often, necessarily assumes our action spaces
are defined as metric spaces. Applicable metrics for the action spaces are not difficult to find, but are cumbersome to describe fully.
We therefore will not belabour this point much further.
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8. Allowed-edges-closedness: given a convergent sequence of action tuples where the mediator plays
only allowed edges, the mediator must play only allowed edges in the limit action tuple as well.
Note that appending meaningless actions (that affect no agent’s utility) to a branch of the game tree will
not affect the game in any impactful way. Thus, for the sake of convenience, we will assume for any game
we consider all leaves of the game occur at the same depth (often denoted by r).
We now give a series of definitions and lemmas that culminate in the main tool used in the proof of
Theorem 2: all mediated games have an SPNE.
Definition 4. A sequence of action tuples (ai1, ..., air
)
|i is said to be consistent if for every j the agent who
plays action aij is constant throughout the sequence and, moreover, its action spaces are always subsets of
[0, 1] or always the same subset of {1, ..., h} throughout the sequence.
Lemma 3. Let
(
ai1, ..., a
i
r
)
|i be a sequence of action tuples in a mediated game. Then there is a convergent
subsequence.
Proof. Due to the finite number of agents and bounded height of the game, we can find an infinite consistent
subsequence ~bi |i=
(
bi1, ..., b
i
r
)
|i. It suffices to show this subsequence has a convergent subsequence of its
own. It is fairly clear that we can find a convergent subsequence via compactness arguments, but there is a
slight caveat: we must show that the limit action tuple is legal. That is, if the limit action tuple is (a1, ..., ar)
we must show that for every i < r such that the mediator plays action i, action i+ 1 is played by the agent
prescribed by ai, and within the bounds prescribed by it. We will prove this by induction.
Base hypothesis: First 0 actions have a convergent subsequence — this is vacuously true.
Induction hypothesis: Assume there exists a subsequence such that the first k actions converge legally.
Induction step: We wish to show that there exists a subsequence such that the first k+1 actions converge.
By the inductive assumption, there exists a subsequence ~ci |i such that the first k actions converge. Now
suppose p plays the k+1th action. If p is the mediator, then the action space is indifferent to actions played
previously and is compact. Thus, the ~ci |i must have a convergent subsequence such that the k+1th element
of the action tuple converges and so we are done.
Alternatively, if p is a regular agent, the action space is not necessarily indifferent to previous actions. If
the action spaces are always the same subset of {1, ..., h}, then we are clearly done. We therefore need only
consider the case where the action spaces will be contained in [0, 1]. Due to the compactness of this interval,
there will be a convergent subsequence of ~ci |i such that the k + 1th action converges to some γ ∈ [0, 1].
Call this subsequence ~di |i.
We argue that γ is in the limit action space of the k + 1th action. For purposes of contradiction, assume
this is false. Let δ be the length from γ to the closest point in the limit action space (i.e. the action space in
the limit given by the kth action played by the mediator). Then there exists some M such that after the M th
element in ~di |i, the closest point in the k+1th action space to γ is at least δ/2 away. Moreover, there exists
some N such that after the N th element in ~di |i the k + 1th action is no further than δ/3 to γ. Elements of
~di |i after element max(M,N) then simultaneously must have the k+1th action space be at least δ/2 away
from γ and have a point at most δ/3 away from γ. This is a clear contradiction.
Lemma 4. For every k, if we have a convergent sequence of action tuples where the kth action from the
end is SPNE, then the kth action from the end for the limit action tuple is also SPNE. That is, for every k,
convergent sequences of (r − k + 1)-SPNE action tuples are (r − k + 1)-SPNE.
Proof. We prove the result by induction on k.
Base Case (k = 0): This is vacuously true.
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Induction hypothesis (k = m): Assume convergent sequences of (r −m + 1)-SPNE action tuples are
(r −m+ 1)-SPNE.
Induction step (k = m+1): Let ~ai |i= (ai1, ..., air) |i be a convergent sequence of (r−m)-SPNE action
tuples with the limit action tuple (a1, ..., ar). We wish to show that if all actions before the last m+1 actions
play their limit actions, then the remaining m+ 1 actions are SPNE — note that by Lemma 3 we know that
the limit sequence is a valid action tuple.
Let p be the agent that commits the m+1th action from the end. If p is the mediator, then by the definition
of mediated games the desired statement is true (specifically via the allowed-edges-closedness condition).
Now suppose instead that p is not the mediator, and simply a regular agent. We show if the m+ 1th action
from the end took on some other valid value α 6= ar−m, there exists SPNE strategies for the remaining m
actions such that p achieves a utility no higher than had it stuck with the limit action of ar−m.
So suppose them+1th action from the end in the ith element of the sequence is αi such that limi→∞ αi =
α. Since ~ai |i is a sequence of (r −m)-SPNE action tuples, we can construct the sequence:
~bi |i= (a
i
1, ..., a
i
r−m−1, α
i, a˜i1, ..., a˜
i
m) |i
where the a˜ij are SPNE actions such that p achieves at most the utility achieved by instead playing air−m.
Via Lemma 3, ~bi |i must have a convergent subsequence — call ~ci |i and indexed by increasing function σ.
That is, ~ci = ~bσ(i). ~ci |i is then a convergent sequence of (r −m+ 1)-SPNE action tuples and thus, by the
inductive assumption, its limit action tuple is also an (r −m+ 1)-SPNE.
Now consider the limit action tuple (a1, ..., ar) (of ~ai |i) and the limit action tuple of ~ci |i denoted by
(c1, ..., cr). Note that:
1. ∀i < r −m: ai = ci.
2. By the continuity requirement of mediated games (where Vp is the utility function of p):
Vp(a1, ..., ar)
= lim
i→∞
Vp(a
i
1, ..., a
i
r)
= lim
i→∞
Vp(a
σ(i)
1 , ..., a
σ(i)
r )
≥ lim
i→∞
Vp(a
σ(i)
1 , ...a
σ(i)
r−m−1, α
σ(i), a˜
σ(i)
r−m+1, . . . , a˜
σ(i)
r )
= lim
i→∞
Vp(c
i
1, ..., c
i
r)
= Vp(c1, ..., cr).
These two points imply that we can set SPNE strategies for the remaining m actions such that the utility of
p playing α is less than or equal to if it plays ar−m for the m + 1th action from the end (when the actions
preceding the m + 1th action from the end are those given in the limit action tuple (a1, ..., ar)). As the α
was arbitrary, the m+1th action from the end of (a1, ..., ar) can be made an SPNE action, which completes
the proof.
Lemma 5. All mediated games have an SPNE.
Proof. We prove the lemma via induction on the height of the game tree. Note that this is possible as
mediated games (like extensive-form games) are recursive: the children of a node of a mediated game are
mediated games.
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Base case (at most 0 actions): This is vacuously true.
Induction hypothesis (at most k actions): Assume we have shown that any mediated game with a game
tree of height at most k has an SPNE.
Induction step (at most k+1 actions): Let p be the agent that commits the first action. If p is the mediator,
any action that is an allowed edge will be SPNE; and if no such action exists, any action will be SPNE (as
the mediator is doomed to a utility of 0). Now suppose p is not the mediator.
Assume by the inductive assumption, once p makes its move, all remaining (at most) k actions are SPNE
actions. By the definition of a mediated game, p’s utility is bounded. Then the least upper bound property of
R implies that p’s utility as a function of the first action must have a supremum S. Via the axiom of choice,
we construct a sequence of possible actions for the first action that approaches S in p’s utility. That is, we
have some sequence xi |i such that if p plays xi for the first action, it achieves some utility f(xi) — where
limi→∞ f(x
i) = S. Moreover, let g(xi) map the action xi to a tuple of the remaining actions — which
are SPNE. By Lemma 3 (xi, g(xi)) |i must have a convergent subsequence (yi, g(yi)) |i that converges to
(y, g(y)) — where y is a legal first action and g(y) are legal subsequent actions.
Notice that (yi, g(yi)) |i is a convergent sequence of 2-SPNE action tuples and thus by Lemma 4,
(y, g(y)) is a 2-SPNE action tuple as well. Furthermore, note that by the continuity requirement of mediated
games, y must give p a utility of S. Therefore, this must be an SPNE action and so we are done.
With this machinery in hand, we are now ready to complete the proof of Theorem 2. Our main task is to
make a formal connection between mediated games and (informed) GCC protocols.
Proof of Theorem 2. Suppose we have a n-agent GCC protocol P with a bounded number of steps and and
set valuations of the agents V1, ..., Vn. Then we wish to prove that there exists an informed GCC protocol
P ′ that is equivalent to P up to tie-breaking such that the game induced by P ′ and V1, ..., Vn has an SPNE.
Outfit P as a game M , such that all but the final condition of mediated games are satisfied — that is,
the mediator enforces the rules of P and achieves utility 1 if it follows the rules of P and 0 otherwise. More
explicitly, the mediator plays every second action and upon examination of the history of events (i.e. the
ordering of the cuts made thus far, and results of choose queries), decides the next agent to play and their
action space based on the prescription of P. To see how all but the last condition is satisfied, we go through
them in order.
1. This is by definition.
2. The height of the tree is twice the height of the GCC protocol.
3. The mediator’s utility is bounded by 1 by definition, and all other agent’s utilities are bounded by 1 as
that is their value of the entire cake.
4. This is by definition.
5. When the mediator wishes to ask a Cut query to agent i in the interval [a, b], it plays the action
(i, (a, b)), whereas when it wishes to ask a Choose query to agent i giving them the choice between
the xth1 , ..., xthk pieces from the left, it plays the action (i, {x1, ..., xk}). This method of giving choose
queries deviates slightly from the definition given in Section 2.1, but the two representations are
clearly equivalent.
6. The allowed edges are ones that follow the rules of P.
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7. This property is only relevant when considering Cut nodes. To establish it, first consider the action in a
single Cut node, and fix all the other actions. We claim that for every ǫ > 0 there exists δ = δ(ǫ) > 0
that is independent of the choice of actions in other nodes such that moving the cut by at most δ
changes the values by at most ǫ. Indeed, let us examine how pieces change as the cut point moves. As
long as the cut point moves without passing any other cut point, one piece shrinks as another grows.
As the cut point approaches another cut point, the induced piece — say k’th from the left — shrinks.
When the cut point passes another cut point x, the k’th piece from the left grows larger, or it remains
a singleton and another piece grows if there are multiple cut points at x. In any case, it is easy to
verify that the sizes of various pieces received in Choose nodes change by at most δ if the cut point
is moved by δ. Furthermore, note that the number of steps is bounded by r and — since the value
density functions are continuous — there is an upper bound M on the value density functions such
that if y − x ≤ δ′ then Vi([x, y]) ≤Mδ′ for all i ∈ N . Therefore, choosing δ ≤ ǫ/(Mr) is sufficient.
Finally, V1, . . . , Vn are continuous even in the actions taken in multiple Cut nodes, because we could
move the cut points sequentially.
We now alter M such that at every branch induced by a comparison of cuts via an If-Else, we allow in
the case of a tie to follow either branch. Formally, suppose at a branch induced by the statement “if x ≤ y
then A else B” we now set in the case of x = y the edges for both A and B as allowed. Then we claim the
property of allowed-edges-closedness is satisfied.
To see this, let us consider action tuples. An action tuple where the mediator in M only plays on allowed
edges can be viewed as a trace of an execution of P which records the branch taken on every If-Else state-
ment — though when there is a tie the trace may follow the “incorrect” branch. A convergent sequence of
such action tuples at some point in the sequence must then keep the branches it chooses in the execution of
P constant — unless in the limit, the cuts compared in a branch that is not constant coincide. Thus, we have
that in the limit, if a branch is constant, the mediator always takes an allowed edge trivially, and otherwise
due to our modification of M the mediator still takes an allowed edge. Furthermore, for all actions of the
mediator that are not induced by If-Else statements, the mediator clearly still plays on allowed edges and so
we have proved the claim.
Now as M is a mediated game, it has an SPNE S by Lemma 5. Let P ′ be the informed GCC protocol
equivalent toP up to tie-breaking such that for every point in the game tree ofM that represents the mediator
branching on an “if x ≤ y then A else B” statement in the original protocol P, P ′ chooses the A or B that
S takes in the event of a tie. Then the informedness of the tie-breaking is built into P ′ and we immediately
see that the SPNE actions of the regular agents in M correspond to SPNE actions in P ′.
C Proof of Theorem 3
The proof of the theorem uses the Thieves Protocol given by Algorithm 4. In this protocol, agent 1 first
demarcates a contiguous allocation X = {X1, ...,Xn} of the entire cake, where Xi is a contiguous piece
that corresponds to agent i. This can be implemented as follows. First, agent 1 makes n cuts such that the
i-th cut is interpreted as the left endpoint of Xi. The left endpoint of the leftmost piece is reset to 0 by the
protocol. Then, the rightmost endpoint of Xi is naturally the leftmost cut point to its right or 1 if no such
point exists. Ties among overlapping cut points are resolved in favor of the agent with the smallest index;
the corresponding cut point is assumed to be the leftmost one. Notice that every allocation that assigns
nonempty contiguous pieces to all agents can be demarcated in this way.
After the execution of the demarcation step, X is only a tentative allocation. Then, the protocol enters
a verification round, where each agent i is allowed to steal some non-empty strict subset of a piece (say,
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Agent 1 demarcates a contiguous allocation X of the cake
for i = 2, . . . , n, 1 do
// Verification of envy-freeness for agent i
Agent i Cuts in {[0, 1]} // @wi
Agent i Cuts in {[wi, 1]} // @ zi
for j = 1 to n do
if ∅ 6= ([wi, zi] ∩Xj) ( Xj then
// Agent i steals a non-empty strict subset of Xj
Agent i Chooses from {[wi, zi] ∩Xj}
exit // Verification failed: protocol terminates
end if
end for
// Verification successful for agent i
end for
for i = 1 to n do
Agent i Chooses from {Xi}
end for
Algorithm 4: Thieves Protocol: Every NE induces a contiguous envy-free allocation that contains the entire
cake and vice versa.
Xj) demarcated for another agent. If this happens (i.e., the if-condition is true) then agent i takes the stolen
piece and the remaining agents get nothing. This indicates the failure of the verification and the protocol
terminates. Otherwise, the pieces of X are eventually allocated to the agents, i.e., agent i takes Xi.
We will require two important characteristics of the protocol. First, it guarantees that no state in which
some agent steals can be a NE; this agent can always steal an even more valuable piece. Second, stealing is
beneficial for an envious agent.
Proof of Theorem 3. Let P be the Thieves protocol given by Algorithm 3 and E be any NE of P. Denote by
X the contiguous allocation of the entire cake obtained during the demarcation step, where Xi = [xi, yi] for
all i ∈ N , and let wi and zi be the cut points of agent i during its verification round. Assume for the sake of
contradiction that X is not envy-free. Let k∗ be an envious agent, where Vk∗(Xj∗) > Vk∗(Xk∗), for some
j∗ ∈ N . There are two cases to consider:
Case 1: Each agent i receives the piece Xi in E . This means that, during its verification round, each agent
i selects its cut points from the set
⋃n
j=1{xj , yj}. By the non-envy-freeness condition for X above (and by
the fact that the valuation function Vk∗ is strictly positive), there exist w′k∗ , z′k∗ such that xj∗ < w′k∗ < z′k∗ <
yj∗ and Vk∗([w′k∗ , z′k∗ ]) > Vk∗([xk∗ , yk∗ ]). Thus, agent k∗ could have been better off by cutting at points
w′k∗ and z′k∗ in its verification round, contradicting the assumption that E is a NE.
Case 2: There exists an agent i that did not receive the piece Xi. Then, it must be the case that some
agent k stole a non-empty strict subset [w′′k , z′′k ] = [wk, zk]∩Zj of another piece Xj . However, agent k could
have been better off at the node in the game tree reached in its verification round by making the following
marks: w′k =
xj+w′′k
2 and z
′
k =
z′′
k
+yj
2 . Since either xj ≤ w
′′
k < z
′′
k < yj or xj < w
′′
k < z
′′
k ≤ yj (recall that
[w′′k , z
′′
k ] is a non-empty strict subset of Xj and the valuation function Vk is strictly positive), it is also true
that Vk([w′k, z′k]) > Vk([w′′k , z′′k ]), again contradicting the assumption that E is a NE.
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So, the allocation computed by agent 1 under every NE E is indeed envy-free; this completes the proof
of the first part of the theorem.
We next show that every contiguous envy-free allocation of the entire cake is the outcome of a NE. Let
Z be such an allocation, with Zi = [xi, yi] for all i ∈ N . We define the following set of strategies E for the
agents:
• At every node of the game tree (i.e., for every possible allocation that could be demarcated by agent
1), agent i ≥ 2 cuts at points wi = xi and zi = yi during its verification round.
• Agent 1 specifically demarcates the allocation Z and cuts at points w1 = x1 and z1 = y1 during its
verification round.
Observe that [wi, zi] ∩ Zj is either empty or equal to Zj for every pair of i, j ∈ N . Hence, the verification
phase is successful for every agent and agent i receives the piece Zi.
We claim that this is a NE. Indeed, consider a deviation of agent 1 to a strategy that consists of the
demarcated allocation Z ′ (and the cut points w′1 and z′1). First, assume that the set of pieces in Z ′ is different
from the set of pieces in Z . Then, there is some agent k 6= 1 and some piece Z ′j such that the if-condition
∅ ⊂ [xk, yk] ∩ Z
′
j ⊂ Z
′
j is true. Hence, the verification round would fail for some agent i ∈ {2, ..., k} and
agent 1 would receive nothing. So, both Z ′ and Z contain the same pieces, and may differ only in the way
these pieces are tentatively allocated to the agents. But in this case the maximum utility agent 1 can get is
maxj V1(Z
′
j), either by keeping the piece Z ′1 or by stealing a strict subset of some other piece Z ′j . Due to
the envy-freeness of Z , we have:
max
j
V1(Z
′
j) = max
j
V1(Zj) = V1(Z1),
hence, the deviation is not profitable in this case either.
Now, consider a deviation of agent i ≥ 2 to a strategy that consists of the cut points w′i and z′i. If both
w′i and z′i belong to
⋃n
j=1{xi, yi}, then [w′i, z′i] ∩ Zj is either empty or equal to Zj for some j ∈ N . Hence,
the deviation will leave the allocation unaffected and the utility of agent i will not increase. If instead one of
the cut points w′i and z′i does not belong to
⋃n
j=1{xi, yi}, this implies that the condition
∅ ⊂ [w′i, z
′
i] ∩ Zj ( Zj
is true for some j ∈ N , i.e., agent i will steal the piece [w′i, z′i]∩Zj . However, the utility Vi([w′i, z′i]∩Zj) of
agent i cannot be greater than Vi(Zj), which is at most Vi(Zi) due to the envy-freeness of Z . Hence, again,
this deviation is not profitable for agent i.
We conclude that E is a NE; this completes the proof of the theorem.
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